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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In the past few years theology has experienced a renewal in the area of hermeneutics. This renaissance includes
more than a stimulating interest in the principles of interpretation, a periodic revival similar to those that have
come and gone in other theological fields. Hermeneutics has
broken the boundaries in which it has been confined since
the age of orthodoxy and assumed totally new proportions,
even to the extent of becoming the focal point of theology
for some theologians. To trace some of the philosophical influences behind and in this movement is the proposed task of
this paper.
The disciplines of philosophy and theology have often,
if not always, influenced one another. For whenever philosophy dealt with "ultimates", it was certain to enter the
territory of theological thinking. And whenever theology
sought to be a logos about God, it automatically dwelt in
the domain of philosophy. Sometimes the two have hadclOser
relations, for example, when philosophy offered and theology
accepted the prestige of a solid, rationally grounded, stable
system. One only need mention the Platonic orientation of
Plotinus, St. Thomas' adaption of Aristotle or the rationalistic coloring of eighteenth century theology. Contemporary
theology has likewise discovered a stimulating basis for its
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germinal thinking in the fertile field of existentialism.
In particular, the structure and terminology of Martin
Heidegger's thought has been almost too readily adaptable
to Biblical themes. His monumental work, Sein un.Zeit (1927),
with its ontological description of man (Dasein), has been
explicitly accepted by Rudolf Bultmann as the most accurate
characterization of man that philosophy has to offer. If
the expressions of Sein und Zeit (Thrownness, Care, Dread,
Destiny) are conducive to theology, even more so are the
almost mystic-like Heideggerian images that have appeared
since 1935.1 These writings have become increasingly concerned with the function of language as a transmitter of
Being to man.
Theologians have been quick to utilize Heidegger's insights in their new hermeneutical quest. Heinrich Ott in
particular has proclaimed an affinity with the "later"
Heidegger as he attempts a refounding of theology along the
lines of hermeneutics. Other theologians, for example,
Gerhard Ebeling and Ernst Fuchs, have likewise shown a favorable disposition toward Heidegger's thinking. However, their
indebtedness is not as vocal as Ott's. For this reason, I
propose to explicate Ott's approach and thereby indirectly
show the influence Heidegger has had on the new hermeneutic
as a whole. First, it must be noted that Ott's work is still
in its initiatory stage. Having recently assumed the chair
of his former professor Karl Barth at the age of 33, he has
published only two major works: Denken und Sein: Der Weg
Martin Heidegger und der Weg der Theologie and Dogmatik und
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Verktindigunq (translated Theology and Preaching). These,
plus Ott's few recent publications, with heaviest emphasis
on Denken und Sein, comprise the source data for one major
portion of the paper. The other block of material extensively covered is that group of Heidegger's later writings
dealing specifically with his view of language and communication. All other materials quoted either helped form the
introductory chapter or expressed salient criticisms and/or
conclusions.
As stated, the paper's main task is one of explication,
first Heidegger (chapter three) and then Ott (chapter four).
These two chapters form the nucleus of the work. Chapter
two offers a brief background survey and definition of the
"new hermeneutic". Chapter five summarizes and draws the
conclusion that the development of this "new hermeneutic"
especially viewed through the thought of Heinrich Ott is
toward an ontological hermeneutic dependent on and influenced
by the thinking of the "later" Heidegger.
Before we proceed, a brief remark about Heidegger's
terminology needs to be made. Any English rendering of
Heidegger's thought=translation or commentary--confronts
this problem. John Mcquarrie and Edward Robinson, translators of Sein und Zeit put it this way.
As long as an author is using words in their ordinary
ways, the translator should not have much trouble in
showing what he is trying to say. But Heidegger is constantly using words in ways which are by no means
ordinary, and a great part of his merit lies in the
freshness and penetration which his very innovations
reflect. He tends to discard much of the traditional
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philosophical terminology, substituting an elaborate
vocabulary of his own. He occasionally coins new
expressions from older roots, and he takes full advantage of the ease with which the German langu ge
lends itself to the formation of new compounds.a
Example's of the above mentioned difficulty include such
terms as existential/ existentiell, Dasein, Historie/
Geschichte, Geschick, Sein/Seienden,Geworfenheit, Beingin-the-worid and Gevierte to name but a few. To facilitate
the reader's understanding, these terms will be further explained in footnotes whenever their appearance in the paper
is not self explanatory.

CHAPTER II
THE "NEW HERMENEUTIC"
The "new hermeneutic"--a phrase constructed by James
Robinson--has become one of the recent additions to the
theologian's vocabulary. Robinson and John Cobb, colleagues
and co-editors, have with the publication of the second
volume of their series New Frontiers In Theology supplied
the definition of this new term. Entitling their work The
New Hermeneutic) the editors have gathered the essays presented at the first Consultation on Hermeneutic assembled at
Drew University in the spring of 1962. The book, like the
Consultation, is to be an exploratory attempt at intercontinental dialogue, for the main essayists are two German
theologians: Gerhard Ebeling and Ernst Fuchs. Robinson has
taken the emphases of these two men, along with those of
Hans-Georg Gadamer,2 to be the principal claims of the new
hermeneutic. Robinson's procedure has been challenged by
Carl Braaten in his recent article "How New Is The New
Hermeneutic?"3 The question is well put, for the FuchsEbeling-Gadamer (and whoever else this may include) hermeneutic acknowledges a definite historical ancestory.
Familiarity with these origins is an indispensible prerequisite for understanding what is meant by the "new hermeneutic".
In its broadest definition, hermeneutic is a process of
clarifying the unclear. Its etymological source is the Greek
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word hermEheia, which in turn took shape and content from
the Greek diety Hermes--herald of the gods. As herald,
Hermes conveyed messages among the gods as well as translated divine thoughts and secrets to men. Correspondingly,
the scope of heregneia included the functions of "speech",
"translation" and even "commentary".

For our purposes

though, the brief historical survey might begin with Luther,
who, as Ebeling contends, retained the breadth and comprehensiveness of the Greek hermTneia through his Reformation
byword "sola scriptura".4 In the years following, in the
wake of the rise of Orthodoxy, "biblical theology" with its
watchword "verbal inspiration" abandoned its viable hermeneutical heritage. Instead "biblical theology" equated
scripture with the Word of God engendering both the split
between sacred and profane hermeneutics and the separation
between exegesis and hermeneutics. Form criticism, with its
inclination toward scientific methodology, even further
limited the scope of hermeneutics. Relegated to the role of
a technical tool in the service of exegesis, hermeneutics
was now restricted to a three-fold task: dealing with the
text established by textual criticism, delving into the historical background of scriptures and treating pericopes as
literary forms.5 Hermeneutics was sterile.
This lethargic confinement was shattered when Karl
Barth published his Commentary on Romans (1918). Barth's
thinking was not radically new; its legacy extended all the
way back to Schleiermacher and Dilthey. Ernst Daniel
Schleiermacher (1768-1834) rejected the conception of her-
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meneutics commonly accepted in his day, i.e., "an aggregate
of individual observations of a general and special nature% 6
Instead of concentrating on "explanation" he focused on the
problem of understanding or on the conditions of the possibility of understanding. Is it possible for understanding
to bridge the gap between past and present? Schleiermacher
contended that comprehension of a literary work produced in
the past includes more than a treatment of external form
(text, historical setting and literary analysis). Interpretation is the imaginative reproduction of the creative
act by which the work was originally produced. Man can
bridge this gap, can establish a rapport with past generations
because human nature in general with its social life allows
for a common, universal speech and understanding.
Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911)7 endorsed the central position to which Schleiermacher had elevated understanding
and sought to objectify it in language. Language is the
objective expression of man's inner workings. Language, then,
is the bridge spanning the historical gap between the text
and the exegete. The exegete through language can cut to the
heart of the author's message because he too has had experiences similar to the ones linguistically objectified by the
author. Bultmann presents Dilthey's method as follows:
"All individual distinctions are ultimately conditioned
not by qualitative differences of persons from each
other, but only by differences of degree in what goes
on in their souls. But while in this the exegete, as
it were, experimentally transposes his own quality of
living into an historical milieu, on the basis of this
he is able momentarily to emphasize and intensify some
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of the processes of his own soul, and to let the others
recede into the background, and so to induce in himself an imitation of a life which is not native to him."
The conditioning of understanding "lies in the fact
that nothing can appear in an unfamiliar, individual
form of expression which was not also contained in the
quality of living that comprehends it". And that can
be interpreted in this way: "Exegesis is a work of
personal art, and its most consummate execution is conditioned by the mental make-up of the exegete; and so
it rests on affinity, intensified by a thoroughgoing
communion with the author--by constant study2' 8
The endowment which Schleiermacher and Dilthey bequeathed
to hermeneutics was the extension of its scope. No longer
bound to exegetical servitude, to the theoretical principles
governing interpretation of historical documents, hermeneutics
now proceeded to lay the foundation of anepistemology in the
"event of language". No wonder Barth's Romans caused such
reaction. Written when the orthodox view of hermeneutics
still prevailed, the Preface to the first edition contained
this statement.
The critical historical method of Biblical research has
its validity. It points to the preparations for understanding that is never superfluous. But if I had to
choose between it and the old doctrine of inspiration,
I would decidedly lay hold of the latter. It has the
greater, deeper, more important validity, for it points
to the actual work of understanding, without which all
preparation is useless. I am happy not to have to choose
between the two. But my whole attention was directed
to looking through the historical to the spirit of the
Bible, which is the eternal spirit.9
We now turn to Rudolf Bultmann and the contributing part
he played in hermeneutics' expanding movement. As did
Schleiermacher and Dilthey before him, Bultmann looked for
the thing (Sache) in the text which linked author and interpreter. He did not find it in an understanding common to
human nature as had his predecessors. Rather, the point of
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contact was the meaningful relation that both author and
interpreter have to the subject (Sache). Bultmann merely
replaced one presupposition with another. Instead of presupposing a common understanding, Bultmann openly avowed
that one goes to the text seeking answers to the questions
of his existence. To this end the writer writes, the interpreter interprets, and both writer and interpreter find the
common thing that answers their particular questions. Presuppositions are not to be scorned, though; in fact, hermeneutics determines with the greatest degree of accuracy
precisely with what presuppositions the author/interpreter
approaches the text.1° The subject content (Sache) becomes
so important for Bultmann (it is larger than either author
or interpreter) that language is even incapable of adequately
transmitting it. Certain forms of language, e.g., mythology,
are more defective than others, but these flaws only particularize and intensify language's inherent incompetence.
At this point, the Robinson defined "new hermeneutic"
turns aside from the negative treatment language received
at the hands of Bultmann to the counteracting, positive positions of Fuchs and Ebeling. These two theologians reinstated
language's priority, not by disregarding the subject matter
(Sache), but by revealing the subject matter's dependence
on language. The language (Sprache) referred to by Fuchs
and Ebeling is language in its most original form--language
as action or as event. This language is a happening or a
showing or a letting be seen.11 Fuchs calls it a language
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event (Sprachereignis), Ebeling a word event (Wortgeschehen).12
Though the radical feature of this motion is that the impetus
originates outside of man, it does not leave man in any way
passive. Language event carries a demand that man
cor-'respond'. The reason, says Robinson, is this.
The subject matter of which language speaks is primarily
being. It is man's very nature to hearken to the
call of being. "Man is is actually this relation of
cor-'respond'-ence, and only this." In this way language is located at the center of man's nature, rather
than being regarded primarily as an objectification of
an otherwise authentic self-understanding. For man's
nature is defined as linguistic, in that his role is to
re-speak, to re-spond, to an-swer the call of being.13
Language is located at the center of man's nature, and
language's location is being (Being). The apparent discrepency14 is resolved when language is also seen as the gift
of Being. Once the gift is received, man responds. Only
in response does language assume the conversational form of
speech and word to which we are normally accustomed. Even
this human speech is directly related to Being, for it
directs the hearer back to the horizons in which he can again
hear language's original utterance. Stated theologically,
the description might be as follows.
It is at this point that the term hermeneutic attains
the specific profile characteristic of the new hermeneutic, as "faith's doctrine of language".. "Being emerges
from language, when language directs us into the dimension of our existence determinative for our life. Is
that the 'meaning' of the word of God? Then hermeneutic
in theology would indeed be nothing else than the
'doctrine of the word of God' (Ebeling), faith's doctrine of language. The reverse is also true: The
theological doctrine of the word of God would be the
question as to being in the horizon of Biblical language."15
The movement from Being through language to man and back again
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has its historic dimensions since the recipient is always
man. This averts a possible criticism of the language
event--its transcendent, timeless communion with Being.
But what happens to the historically conditioned biblical
texts with which hermeneutics has traditionally dealt?
How does the language event affect the historic Jesus?
Robinson answers:
Perhaps nowhere more clearly then here does one hear
the sense in which the "saving event" is a "language
event", since language, when it is true language, is
God's saving word. And perhaps nowhere more clearly
than here does one hear the central role of language
in a new theology that has its foci in the historic
Jesus and hermeneutic. For the "historic Jesus" is
heard not as "objective factuality", but as "word of
address"; and "hermeneutic" is heard not as "understanding in a speechless profundity," but as "translation into language that speaks today". Thus hermeneutic
is the method suited to the historic Jesus, and the historic Jesus is the material poi pt of departure for a
recovery of valid hermeneutic.1°
The historic is taken into account, but the main emphasis still
resides in language--the originative language event. This
emphasis of Fuchs and Ebeling, Robinson takes to be the unique
factor in the new hermeneutic, and for this reason he has reintroduced the singular "hermeneutic". The "new hermeneutic"
signals the surpassing of Orthodoxy's confinement and the
reinstatement of the comprehensiveness included in the
original Greek hermeneia. Fuchs and Ebeling have chosen the
theory of understanding and originative language as their
primary concerns, and these elements, as we shall see in the
analyses of Heidegger and Ott, have led the new hermeneutic
to embrace what Michalson and Gadamer call an ontological
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1.1ermeneutic.17 We now turn to Heidegger to begin our
analysis

CHAPTER III
THE FUNCTION OF LANGUAGE AND HERMENEUTIC
IN THE "LATER" HEIDEGGER.
No matter where one meets Heidegger, he will soon encounter the dominating theme with which Heidegger constantly
grapples--the overcoming of metaphysics. This is the project envisioned in the introductory paragraph of Sein and
Zeit. Metaphysics has deprived the question of Being of any
content and left it meaningless and superfluous. Plato was
the culprit who sidetracked the genuine quest of the preSocratics away from Being itself and instead centered the
search in beings. From Plato onwards the tradition of Western
metaphysics never found its way back to the authentic inquiry. The extensive Grecian view of physis including the
study of first causes or principles, shrunk to a concern with
material objects. This standpoint underwent further confinement in the development of techyu. Material entities
became objectified as manipulatable tools. Thoughtbecame
focused in beings, their description and practical use.
Even the transcendent was conceived of in terms of being,
either the summation of all beings (analogia entis) or that
which being was not (via negitiva). This fruitless methodology was carried to its limits in Hegel's equation of the
rational with the real. One necessary step remained-Nietzsche's declaration that "God is dead", that a meta-
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physics restricted to the examination of beings has no
further contribution to make.
To escape metaphysic traditional pitfall and to
initiate a new approach to the Question of Being (i.e., to
revitalize the freshness of the original, pre-Socratic one),
Heidegger proposed to erect an ontology via the method of
phenomenology. Phenomenology is a method employing
description and finds its meaning in interpretation
(hermeneutic). Through a process of elimination, Heidegger
chose Dasein (man) as the only possible being whose description is capable of revealing something about Being.- The
repercussions of this choice are important because
the phenomenology of Dasein is a hermeneutic in the
primordial signification of this word, where it
designates this business of interpreting. But to the
extent that by uncovering the meaning of Being and the
basic structures of Dasein in general we may exhibit
the horizon for any further ontological study of those
entities which do not have the character of Dasein,
this hermeneutic also becomes a "hermeneutic" in the
sense of working out the conditions on which the possibility of any ontological investigation depends.2
Heidegger sought to discover Dasein's Existentiales-ontology's counterpart to metaphysics' categories. These
Existentiales--Thrownness, Care, Speech (Rede) and many others-continue to maintain their validity even though Heidegger
later admitted that his attempt to found an ontology along
the lines of Sein and Zeit was inadequate; it lapsed back
into metaphysical thinking; it was merely a step on the way.3
Even before this overt comment was made such commentators
as DeWaelhens, Jean Wahl and Karl Lowith claimed that
Heidegger had abandoned his projected work of destroying
metaphysics and instead embraced a kind of poetic mysticism.3

15
So as not to be sidetracked by this controversy, we simply
cite Langan's comment that it is possible to speak of a
shift in accent in Heidegger's thought.4 There have been
several possible interpretations of this shift: the deviation toward mysticism mentioned above or the turn from Nichts
zum Sein as seen by Heinrich Ott.5 No interpretation is
conclusive. But it is not difficult to isolate one major
trend--Heidegger's attentiveness to Being and his increasing
preoccupation with language as the link between Being and
Dasein. On this latter shift in thought we now concentrate
our attention.
The most engaging question which Heidegger raises is
the relation which man (Dasein) has to Being. If ontic,
everyday affairs lie closest to man's immediate interests
while his ontological structures farthest, and if man's obsession with the ontic (beings) has incapacitated the metaphysical or ontological approach, what method or event or
process is capable of vaulting us over these trivialities
to the place where an authentic questioning of Being can
be undertaken? Sein and Zeit pointed to one possible solution--acceptance of one's death. Much too briefly stated,
the line of argument went something like this. Da-sein6
discovers himself "thrown" (Geworfen) into the world. This
view of the past is also coupled with Understanding
(Verstehen)--the ability to project into the future--and
Discourse (Rede)--the ability to make the future and past
present in words. Future, past and present, and in that
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order, are the three prongs of Heideggerian temporality.
These temporal aspects, however, are not of the same
"value".7 The aspect of futurity stands out from the others
in that the past and present are finally given their full
meaning in terms of the future. The importance of the future
comes about in this way. Dasein is the type of being for
which Being is an issue for it because Dasein grasps itself
in its wholeness. To do this it (Dasein) must be able to
apprehend its limits, particularly its end. Dasein's ending
limit is death--the one thing it cannot experience. The
death of the Other can be experienced, but only as a
Vorhandenheit8 or in an objective way. Experience of my own
death is impossible because death means the impossibility
of being any longer. Dasein's relationship to its death
does not remain meaningless though, for the full existential
import of death is an experiencing of Sein-zum-Tode (Beingtowards-death). Being-towards-death makes Dasein primarily
futurally oriented.
The primacy of this future orientation can be further
grasped by tracing the steps through which Dasein is made
aware of his Being-towards-death. Care was discovered through
anxiety which resulted from the nausl'e experienced in the
un-authentic modes of being.9 Likewise, Being-towards-death
is apprehended in the Call of conscience. Conscience's Call
issues from the silent uncanniness experienced in Dasein's
awareness of the meaning of death. The Call says nothing; it
merely brings Dasein face to face with the "Nothing"--that
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which death points to. Conscience and its Call have a
positive aspect too. Not only does conscience confront
Dasein with the Nothing; because it manifests itself as
the Call of Care, conscience calls Dasein to "Resoluteness";
it calls Dasein forth into the Situation. In other words,
"conscience suggests a note of awareness, the kind of
awareness that is born of a steady gaze directed at things
0
as they are"1 Authentic living is resolute acceptance of
that which is--the Nothing revealed in death. This acceptance
is included in the phrase "Being-towards-death". Dasein
lives authentically when he orients his life as a Beingtowards-death, when he interprets his past and present in
terms of the future. This makes Dasein an Ek-sistent; he
stands out of his past thrownness and immersion in the
present "they" to resolutely accept his possibilities as
Being-towards-death.
Sein und Zeit masterfully analyzes contemporary man
encumbered with mass thinking and mores, yet possessing the
potential possibility through Care, Conscience and Resolve
to throw off these shackles. It is mainly these Heideggerian
insights that have found ready acceptance, e.g., Binswanger
in psychology or Bultmann in theology, despite Heidegger's
claim that Sein und Zeit was to be much more than an
anthropological description, that it was primarily an exploratory probe into the questioning of Being. Being-towards-death
relates man to himself, but how is he related to Being? As
Heidegger approached this question in the years after
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Sein and Zeit, his stress on "Nothingness" was the first
indication of a shift in accent. What Is Metaphysics (1929)
and a later introduction to this essay, The Way Back Into
The Ground Of Metaphysics,11 poses THE question, "Why is
there any being at all and not rather Nothing? u12

A

biased regard for beings occasioned metaphysics' downfall;
man's vision was wretchedly curtailed. His salvation lay
in transcending these ontic concerns--a transcendence into
"Nothingness". Conscience's call to Resoluteness was really
the call of Nothingness. In this call freedom inserted
nothingness between Dasein and Seienden (beings) and allowed
the Seiendento be seen for the first time for what they
truely were--thingness. Nothingness accomplished this by
revealing the boundaries and wholeness of man's situation.
It is thus (in Nothing) that I come to see that the
presence of anything and everything before me is a
united whole, as I also see that it is due to nothing
other than my own finite horizon-projection. I see
for the first time clearly, that the Seienden als
Ganzen could not "be" without my Da-sein, and at the
same time I realize that the apparent solidity of that
"world" of things offers no lasting thing upon which I
can depend as arotection from the dissolution of the
world in death.1'
The immediate inclination seems negative, but the overriding
influence is positive (similar to the role "law" plays in
the Christian life). Nothing is not a projection of Dasein's
mind--a mental apprehension of the contrary of being. Nothing
is Being itself. For this reason only can man experience it.
Because Being is an issue for Dasein, so is Nothing an issue.
"The nihilating (das Nichtende) in Being is the essence of
what I call the Nothing. Because it thinks Being, thought
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thinks Nothing. 1,14
In Sein and Zeit the experience of Nothingness was
closely bound up with the particular mood (Stimmung) Angst.
Angst prompted the step into Nothing which in turn executed
the Call of Conscience. Heidegger's later writings tend to
shy away from this rather "subjective" (Dasein originating)15
link with Nothing. Man is "thrown" into a necessary relation with Nothing. Another perspective of Nothing is the
Heilige. The Holy as an aspect of Being brings into focus
at least three important Heideggerian concepts: Dasein's
"wandering in need", transcendence and openness for Being.
Dasein is more than a being consciously moving towards his
death. Dasein is a transcendental creature. Recall how
authentic man pro-jected (to) his limiting horizons.
Transcendence resembles this pro-ject with this exception-how Being is the subject. "The preliminary definition of
'Being as the transcendens as such' expresses simply the
way in which the essence of Being has so far been cleared
for man."16 Being clears itself; it creates an openness
for Being.
A knotty problem develops in man's relation to Being.
Where does the impetus begin? Is Dasein dependent on Being?
If so, in what way is he transcendent? Heidegger gives no
clear answer; in fact, he does not raise the question. He
merely portrays man as a wanderer. Again this calls to
mind Dasein's dual structure: his "throwness", his proneness
to become lost in the "they" and his ec-static nature. Here
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a shift in Heidegger is evident. Ex-sistence is no longer
acceptance of Death--man's limiting horizons; ex-sistence
portrays man emerging into the transcendent openness for
Being.
Man is and is man insofar as he is the existing. He
stands exposed to the openness of Being, an openness
which is Being itself, that has projected the essence
of man into "care". So thrown, man stands "in" the
openness of Being. "World" is the clearing of Being,
wherein man stands out from his thrown essence.
"Being-in-the-World" names the essence of ex-sistence
in relation to the cleared dimension out of which the
"ex" of the ex-sistence essentially arises. Thought
of from the point of view of ex-sistence, "world" is
in a way transcendence within and for existence.17
A transcendence within the world signals that Being is somehow mysteriously18 separated from Dasein--that transcendence
itself is no direct path to Being. Within the world man
fluctuates between a concern for practical everyday affairs
and an attentiveness to Being. As man becomes more and
more immersed in the present, he experiences an immense
vacuity which makes him aware of Being's absence. This constant and necessary oscillation between practical matters
and the mystery of Being Heidegger calls a "wandering in
need"19 A continual wandering would render Dasein's life
a worthless one were it not that Being destines otherwise.
What is openness for Being? The impetus seems to stem from
Being itself. "Being clears itself for man in ecstatic
projection. But this projection does not create Being. u20
Dasein's ex-sistence is Being's destiny.21 Of course, only
as long as Dasein is, is there Being. That is, only if
the clearing of Being is realized is Being conveyed to man.
"That the 'Da' (Here), however, the clearing of Being itself
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is realized, is the destination of Being itself. This is
the destiny of the clearing.„ 22 Man possesses one certainty; he is essentially only in his essence in which he
is claimed by Being.23 "Only from this claim 'has' he (man)
found wherein his essence dwells. Only from this dwelling
'has' he 'language' as the home which preserves the ecstatic
for his essence."24
Dasein's ex-sistence, Being's destiny and thus man's
destiny are all dependent on language. Openness for
Being is embodied in language; language is the house of
Being. Within the context of language, Heidegger introduces the important term Denken (Thought). Normally,
0N

Denken belongs to man. Heidegger, however, enlarges this
common notion. Thought is of Being he claims. As subjective
genetive this means that thought belongs to Being; as objective genetive thought listens to or heeds Being.25
Thought must not be confused with theoretical or practical
activity and behavior; it supercedes such operations in that
it precedes them.
Thought is related to Being as the arriving. Thought
is as thought in the advent of Being, is bound to Being
as arrival. Being has already destined itsel to
thought. Being is as the destiny of thought.f6
Thinking assists the openness or clearing for Being by taking
Being's unspoken word and shaping it into language. "Thus
language is at once the house of being and the dwelling of
human beings."27 Again Heidegger warns against mistaking

22
language with the usual unity of sound-form, melody,
rhythym and meaning. "The point is to think of the essence
of- language in its correspondence to Being, and what is
more, as this very correspondence, i.e., the dwelling of
man's essence."28 Correspondence (entsprechen) implies
a speaking (sprechen); language as originative thinking
penetrates the silent,, wordless uncanniness of Being,
listens to this mute utterance and corresponds by incarnating this experience in language.29 The Greek language
is the classic example, for
in the Greek language what is said in it is at the same
time in an excellent way what it is called. If we
hear a Greek word with a Greek ear we follow its
lecrein (its speaking), its direct presentation. What
it presents is what lies immediately before us. Through
the audible Greek word we are directly in the presence
of the thing itself, not first in the presence of a
mere word sign.
Furthermore, language is essential as conversation. That
the gods have led us into conversation is the basis of the
proposition that language is the supreme event of human
existence. Yes, we have been a single conversation since
the time when it "is time".31
One caution is to be noted. Being's uncanniness never
permits exact translation into language. "Language is (both)
the clearing-and-concealing advent of Being itself."32 Being's
transparencyinlanguage is limited by the complex way in
which language unfolds in the historical (Geschichtliche)33
and is consummated in poetry. Language guarantees that man
can exist historically in that previous thinkers have moulded
their thinking in language. "To express over and over again
the advent of Being, permanent and in its permanence waiting
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for man, is the only matter for thought. That is why the
essential thinkers always say the same thing."34 Langan
outlines the procedure in this manner.
Essential thinking, on the other hand, pulls the
Seienden from the darkness of night into the light of
Being. Heidegger, as we -have seen, emphasizes the
originativeness in this, the act of interpretation.
Far from being a passive process of objective impression, interpretation demands that Dasein radiate the
light of new intelligence from his own resources,
i.e., from out of the Nothing, to illumine the Wesen,
capturing the new meaning that it discovers there in
that house of language which Dasein has built to protect Being's revelation in time. Dasein gathers up
from the past the light that other generations have
brought to bear on the Seienden and thus, extending
the range of previous insights, prolongs the tradition
toward the future, which it thus builds-Qut existentially.
So it is that das Sein kommt nach Hause.35
History is a limiting factor in another way. As seen above,
Being is the destiny of thought. Destiny limits by holding
back. "The innermost essence of home is already the destiny
of. Providence, or as we now call it: History. Nevertheless,
in the dispensation of Providence, the essence is not yet
completely handed over. It is still being held back."36 History restricts what is to be said about Being and how this
is to be said by constantly considering "whether that which
has-to-be-thought may be said, to what extent, at what moment
in the history of Being, in what dialogue with it, and with
what claim. "37
Poetry is the sphere in which originative thought,
language and history coalesce. Its relation to history is
expressed as follows. "Being as the destiny that destines
truth remains concealed. But the world's destiny is proclaimed
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in poetry without its becoming apparent at once as the history of Being."38 Thinking and language are wed together
with poetry in one of Heidegger's more familiar phrases,
"The thinker pronounces Being; the poet names the Holy".39
The poet names the Holy; he establishes the permanent by the
word and in the word;" in this naming the poet comes into
the proximity of the Homeland (openness for Being);41 he
is cast out into the Between--between the gods and the
people.42 Original thinking--fundamental poetizing--makes
language possible. In naming the Holy the poet "grasps" the
High One himself, i.e., causes the High One to appear in
words.43 In naming the Holy the poet also brings the Word
to where past, present and future meet and thus transcends
this man or this time. But the naming of the Holy does not
reside completely with the poet. "The poetic word only
acquires its power of naming when the gods themselves bring
us to language. How do the gods speak? '....And signs to
us from antiquity are the language of the gods.44 The speech
of the poet is the intercepting of these signs, in order to
pass them on to his own people."45 Therefore the poet needs
careful writers and thinkers whose own remembrance will help
retain the elusive words of poetry in all their truth. For
poetry is to result in a process of understanding that will
enable each hearer to have a Homecoming in the manner appropriate for him.46
Once this point has been reached, it takes little effort
to recall the Existentiales of Sein and Zeit, couple them
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with the prominent place of language and the suggestive
function of poetry and see in these expressions a very
definite similarity to religious vocabulary. As usual,
Heidegger's explicit pronouncements on this relationship
are not precise. Heidegger has repeatedly maintained a
neutrality in regard to value or religious judgments. His
is to be solely a phenomenological description. "Therefore, with the existential determination of the essence of
man nothing has yet been decided about the 'existence'
or 'non-existence' of God, not about the possibility or
impossibility of God."47 In his The Fundamental Question
of Metaphysics Heidegger depicts "Christian philosophy"
as a round square and a misunderstanding. "Only epochs
which no longer fully believe in the true greatness of
the task of theology arrive at the disastrous notion that
philosophy can help to provide a refurbished theology if
not a substitute for theology, which will satisfy the needs
and tastes of the time. For the original Christian faith
philosophy is foolishness."48 But the outcome is not quite
so clear cut. A vague dependence of theology on philosophy
emerges in the designation of the "Holy" as an aspect of
Nothingness. Remembrance of the Poet introduces a seemingly
synonymous symbol for the "Holy"--the "Gevierte". In this
"place?". (situation?, encounter?) earth, heaven, divinities
and mortals fuse into an unity which demands that we men
"save", "receive", and "wait on" Being.49 Or the relation
is stated in these terms. Being is not god, yet is closer
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to man than any other being, be it a rock, an animal, a
machine, an angel or God.5° The divine, however, is
nearer to us than the strangeness of animals. And the
divine (God) can only be encountered when one is in a right
relation to Being.
Only from the truth of Being can the essence of the
holy be thought. Only from the essence of the holy can
the essence of divinity be thought. Only in the
light of the essence of divinity can it be thought and
said what the word 'God" is to signify. Or must we
not first be able to understand and hear these words
carefully if we as men, i.e., as existing beings, are
to have the privilege of experiencing a relation of
God to man? How, then, is the man of the present
epoch even to be able to ask seriously and firmly
whether God approaches or withdraws when man omits the
primary step of thinking deeply in the one dimension
where this question can be asked: that is, the dimension of the holy, which, even as dimension, remains
closed unless the openneeof Being is cleared and in
its clearing is close to man. Perhaps the distinction
of this age consists in the fact that the dimension
of grace hgq been closed. Perhaps this is its unique
dis-grace.'i
One final topic demands closer attention before we discuss the theological implications Heinrich Ott reads into
Heidegger. Again the aforementioned question must be asked.
What is the origin of the impetus that instigates the languageevent? What part does Being play? How much activity can
be ascribed to man? The evidence is vague. In the first
place, Dasein finds himself thrown (Geworfen) into the world
in such a way that he naturally succumbs to the sterile
thinking patterns of the "they" (Verfallen), at least to some
degree. Fallen Dasein wanders about in need. But Dasein exsists, he stands out from his position; he stands out in the
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openness of Being. Man himself does not do the projecting, though. "What projects in the project is not
man, but Being himself, which destines man to the exsistence which is the essence of Dasein. This destiny is
realized as the clearing of Being."52

It is within this

clearing, this nearness (Homeland) that "the decision, if
any, is reached as to whether and how God and the gods deny
themselves and the night remains, whether and how the day
of the Holy dawns, whether and how in the rise of the Holy
an appearance of God and the gods can start anew ".

Man's

activities seem limited to two responsibilities. He must
somehow undergo a long, patient preparation of waiting or
letting happen. And if the destiny of Being projects the
advent of itself to man by addressing and claiming him
through language, man corresponds by housing this encounter
in language. Dasein is the Shepherd of Being.
Ours is a task of preparation and anticipation for an
essential h8ren of what the true poet names and the
originative thinker says. We are to hear and to preserve.
It is not given to everyone to name the holy, but it is
the duty of everyone in the absence of the God (i.e., in
the epoch of de-ontologization, of Seinvergessenheit), to
listen as the poet names that NAhe (proximity) which remains ever fern (distant), the Being to which we ourselves are the way of access, but which we never fully
discover.54

CHAPTER IV
THE HERMENEUTIC OF HEINRICH OTT
Despite the claim of neutrality, the "later" Heidegger
has bequeathed to theology a thought structure and phraseology ripe with possibilities. If through Bultmann
Heidegger's demand for authentic self acceptance has influenced Biblical exegesis, does not his stress on and use
of language offer an even more appropriate direction for
theological hermeneutics? Chapter two briefly sketched a
possible line of development. But now we would like to
take the theologian who has most exclusively dealt with
Heidegger--a systematician who views the nature of theology
1--Heinrich Ott. Ott claims
as a whole as hermeneutical'
that Heidegger is not as neutral as he seems, that Heidegger
does see in theology a capacity for genuine thinking distinct from science's inability to think.
I am quite aware that in his works Heidegger's position on Christian faith and theology is not unambiguous.
Yet, in spite of the obscurities on this point that
emerge when one surveys the complete work of Heidegger,
I maintain that one can document unambiguously from
Heidegger's writings the distinct thread of connection
I seek to establish, the correspondence between
Heidegger's thinking and the self-understanding of
dogmatics. It cannot be denied that the aspect of
importance to me has its basic lines set out in Heidegger's
own work.2
This statement raises two important questions which the
following chapter will attempt to answer: What is the relation of philosophy and theology? How has this relation
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influenced Ott's hermeneutic? Neither can be answered with
precise clarity. In the first place, Ott views the task of
theology as necessarily flexible. He condemns as futile an
obsession with particulars at the expense of the larger
context. Or in line with Barth's plea, Ott resists Barthian
scholasticism and instead discovers God's message as true
though not final, as a message in need of genuine retractation, as a message that forms the presupposition of what
has now to be thought out.3 In the second place, Ott's
recent arrival as a major thinker in theological circles,
his youth and as yet the small handful of publications4
reveal the continuing heavy influence of his teachers (Barth
and Bultmann). Ott's thinking has yet to come into its

own.
The Introduction to Ott's latest book, Theology and
Preaching (1961), offers guidelines for answering our two
questions. Paying his indebtedness to Bultmann for the
insight, Ott here distinguishes between ontology and hermeneutics.
Rightly understood, hermeneutics and ontology are
bound up with each other in the closest possible way.
Hermeneutically we inquire into the specific modus
loquendi, the mode of speaking (and therewith into the
"whence") of the individual Biblical testimonies;
ontologically we inquire into the specific modus essendi,
the mode of being, of the reality to which they testify. We shall not succeed in achieving the break-through
to the real man, unanimously postulated by Barth,
Bonhoeffer and Bultmann, if we neglect these two,
closely inter-connected questions.6
The modus loquendi obviously involves the question of hermeneutics. The ontological, inquiring as it does into the
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mode of being, undertakes a relation to philosophy. For
in order to break through to his "real" being, man must
properly grasp his limiting horizons, where he stands in
relation to them,how they affect him and vice versa. Ott
points toward the theological-philosophical interaction in
these words.
So ist die Begegnung zwischen Theologie und Philosophie
aus zwei GrUnden unvermeidlich: 1. weil die Theologie
selber zum moglichen philosophischen Denkinhalt geworden
ist; 2. weil die Theologie im Verfolgen ihrer eigenen
spezifischen Grundlagenforschung genotigt ist, sich
auf das Feld philosophischer Fragestellungen zu begeben.7
Let it be noted that Ott does not indiscriminately merge
the two. At several points the tasks are similar, but "der
Unterschied zwischen dem philosophischen und dem theologischen
Denken und Reden liegt, so sagten wir, darin, das das
letztere sich auf die Offenbarung des Wortes Gottes beruft".8
Ontology assists man (being) in penetrating his horizons
(Sein) where experiencing his limits (Nothingness) he comes
face to face with the only important Seinsfrage, "Why are
there beings at all and not nothing?" Encounter with the
uncanny silence of this Nothing establishes man as "thinkingman" (Denken), enables him to transcend the "they's" engrossing concern with beings and sustains his continued interest
in the Seinsfrage. In other words, the way proceeds from
being (Seienden-man and/or Bible texts) through Nothing (the
Unthought) to Being (Revelation) and back to being again
(Correspondence).9 Sounds Heideggerian, you say? Perhaps,
but it is also Ott's way of theology. Though Nothingness
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has a heavy negative ring which some have interpreted as
the eliminationS111 God talk,10 Ott reads a more positive
note into this experience. "In dieser Erfahrung (des
Nichts) kommt er (Mensch) faktisch vor Gott und die
creatio e nihilo. Die Erfahrung des Nichts und in ihr die
Frage nach dem Sein des Seienden ist ein Moment der Gottesbegegnung des die Welt denkenden, des philosophierenden
Menschen."11 But Ott wants to impart an even fuller content
to the experience of Nothingness, which we remember from
Heidegger is the Unthought aspect of Sein. "Hat nicht
die Theologie ihr Ungedachtes in der Erfahrung des Glaubens,
aus der sie herkommt und in die sie zurtickfthrt?"12 And to
continue:
Das Sein Gottes bedeutet, so wie °sein" bis jetzt
verstanden haben,13 ein Geschehen der Entbergung:
dass Gott sich dem Denken entbirgt als der, der Er ist;
das Er selber als ein Geschick das Denken trifft und
sich ihm als zu-denkende Sache aufgibt, dass Er dem
Denken als Anspruch begegnet und vom denkenden Menschen ein Entsprechen in Freiheit fordert. Das vom
Sein Gottes "getroffene" Denken is aber das Denken
des Glaubens.14
Theology's attestation to man's mode of being begins when
the faith-thinker is placed in the Unthought (the experience
of faith itself) where he receives the gift of Revelation.
The "conditions of the possibility of thinking" which
Heidegger correlated with Sein

and Nothingness, are for

theology somehow bound up both with Revelation and with
Faith. Via the Unthought, a thinking faith breaks through to
Revelation (its limits) and back again to show man what he
"really" is. And this thinking quite clearly crosses
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philosophic lines--the philosophy of Heidegger, that is.
Just piercing into the Unthought of Revelation and
listening to its muteness is not sufficient. Revelation
demands of thinking man a cor-respondence in freedom.
Correspondence takes place at the human level, is embodied
in language and thus brings into play the modus loquendi.15
Ott has supplied another outline into which the material
in this section can be channeled. His article "What Is Systematic
Theology?"

splits the motion of theology into a threefold

division: exegesis, dogmatics and proclamation. Though
the framework remains somewhat unwieldly, it allows
us to see the basic movement of Ott's hermeneutics. Exegesis
receives for Ott a philosophical flavor in two ways. First
Ott appeals to Heidegger's phenomenological method summarized
in Husserl's phrase "to the things themselves". Allowing
things to show themselves for what they are tends to eliminate
predetermined conclusions that often distort men's vision.
Theology too, says Ott quoting Barth, must defend itself
against the unhealthy pressures of alien influences.
Theology too must heed the injunction of phenomenology and
return to its own theological, not philosophical, foundations.
Reformation theology has such a ready made principle at
hand--"Scriptura sacra sui ipsius interpres".16 Are
scriptures, then, the "thing itself" to which exegesis
must return? Will scriptures "let happen" or "show" or
"unbare" whatever theology has to offer? Yes and No. Yes,
in that exegesis must always begin with the concrete text.
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Previous hearers of revelation have (cor)-responded in
language with just these words, though we do well to
remember the historic conditioned presuppositions under
which they labored. No, in that by themselves scriptures
never offer a complete showing. They channel us to the
place where revelation can be encountered. Scriptures are
the phenomenal point of departure, but they are only part
of a larger complex--the Word of God. They project us
into a sphere in which revelation can be heard and integrated
with our being in a way that takes on "real" meaning. This
two-directional movement stamps on exegesis its second link
with philosophy.
Zum Spezifischen der Theologie, namlich zu ihrer
Berufung auf die Offenbarung des Wortes Gottes, gehort
allerdings ihr gehorsames }Oren auf konkrete Texts.
Wenn sie daneben den philosophischen Wesenblick mit
intergriert, so ist dies nichts Zusatzliches und
Zufalliges,sondern es gehort mit zu ihrem Wesen. Denn
in der Offenbarung des Wortes Gottes begegnet ihr ein
Anspruch, welcher, aufs Ganze geht. Wenn sie diesen
Ganzheitanspruch ernst nehmen will, darf sie sick
nicht in partikularen Raumen bewegen, sondern muss die
Gesamtheit der jeweils zuganglichen Phanomene des
Wirklichen mitbedenken, und zwar nicht gewaltsam,
sondern so, wie die Phanomene selbst es erfordern,
und d.h. eben: philosophisch.17
In so doing exegesis has broadened its scope to include
dogmatics.
Dogmatics moves out beyond the individual text, unifies
it with the total compass of theology and presents it to
the preacher. "Hermeneutical arch" is one of Ott's symbolic
descriptions of this process. The other retains the more
traditional picture of the hermeneutical circle. At this
level the differences between ontological and hermeneutical
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functions are obliterated and the two merge into what
Michalson calls an ontological hermeneutic. 18 At the
basis of this merger is Ott's absorbing concern with
understanding and thinking. Faith must be unfolded in
thinking; fides quaerens intellectum. Thinking or understanding must operate within a circle--a methodological
or hermeneutical principle which Ott, adapting from
Heidegger, defines in this way. "Wir verstehen darunter ein
Vorgehen, bei dem eine Grosse durch eine andere und diese
wiederum durch jene erldutere wider, A durch B und B
durch A bzw. zwei Aspekte ein und derselben Sache einander
wechselseitig erhellen."19 At one level this circle sends
dogmatics back to the exegesis of particular passages. At
another level it moves out to thinking to probe the conditions of the possibilities of understanding. The conditions
underlying a faith impregnated understanding were the
horizons of the Unthought in which Revelation speaks. To
this sphere, are the believers led by dogmatics through the
channel of concrete texts.
Wir haben nicht Paulus, Johannes und die Synoptiker,
Jessaja und die Psalmen usw. "auslegen", indem wir
genau "herattlffinden", was sie mit jedem einzelnen Satz
"gemeint" haben. (Dass man das bis zu einem gewissen
Grade Kann und auch sol, sei nich bestritten!). Sondern
wir haben vor alien mit ihnen ins Gesprgch zu kommen,
uns von ihnen ins Gegendber zur gemeinsamen "Sache"
der Offenbarung bringen zu lassen, damit auch wir auf
Gottes Wort eine Antwort erteilen konnen (denn nur
antwortend sind wir Oberhaupt in der Lage, wirklich
zu horen:1--und dies alles darum, weil wir mit ihnen
allen zusammen zur einen communio sanctorum gehoren.
Aus diesem ursprtinglicheren Ansatz, dieser neuen
Dimension der Hermeneutik, ldsst sich dann dartiber
:verhandeln, welches Recht und wievielWahrheit den
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Ergebnissen der historisch-kritischen Exegese im
Einzelnen zukommen mag. 20
Hermeneutics is no longer confined to the task of the modus
loquendi. It now operates with a more original form of
language than a pericope.21

On the one hand it must clarify

as far as possible the mystic like language (poetry) that
lets a hearing of revelation take place. On the other hand
it must offer guidelines for man's response of incorporating
the hearing into human speech--a conversation among the
communion of saints.
Language's original movement with which hermeneutics is
concerned and which is the foundation of all other types of
communication--written words, speech, etc.--is best described
by Ott in his latest article, "Das Problem des nichtobjektivierenden Denkens and Redens". Ott affirms the nonobjective22 character of theological language by comparing
it to three similar types of expression: poetry, political
speech and philosophical language. Each has its unique task
differing from the informational function of objective language. For example, poetry is an event in the hearing of
which man is brought to a determined place, into the almighty,
shattering silence of the Geheimnis. Words do not refer
to specific objects; they do, but only in so far as they
are the vehicles which bring the hearer to the Geheimnis.23
In fact, words first speak to us.24 Political speech likewise guides man to a place--a place of responsibility. And
the philosopher's words, instead of informing or pointing
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to particulars, direct man to an essential Wesenblick.
Ott combines these traits as he sketches the operation of
theological language. Theological thinking and speaking
are also events bringing men to a place--the place of
revelation or the Geheimnis Gottes. The place is further
described as a place of freedom where man can obediently
hear and witness (bezeugen) to the Word of God. Hearing is
an event (Tun) evoking an "inner"/"outer" hearing called
faith. Because man occupies a place in this shattering
silence of God's Geheimnis, because he is set free to hear
and witness and because as man he also occupies the house
of language,25

not only must he do dogmatics, he must also

respond to God's revelation in proclamation. Ott would say,
"dass in der kerygmatischen Rede ein Mehsch jetzt und hier
vor bestimmten andern Menschen das Wort Gottes verantwortet,
indem er es ihnen zu-spricht, w4hrend die theologische Rede
den Menschen und den Ort bringt, wo er die parrhesia zu
solchem Verantworten gewinnt".26
Proclamation (preaching) and exegesis form opposite ends
of Ott's hermeneutical arch. The exegete approaches the
text as the "thing itself", lets the text manifest its own
content. Next, the exegete hands his discoveries over to
the dogmatician; the dogmatician unifies this particular
pericope within the whole context of theology and hands it
back to the preacher. The process is much too crudely
depicted, but it is sufficient for noting the curious change
in Ott's thinking. Ott has said little about proclamation.
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Throughout his works numerous references and illusions occur27
but nothing of an extended nature. Even in his book Theology
and Preaching, preaching is always discussed in conjunction
with theology. Ott is not trying to belittle proclamation.
It is the necessary correspondence to God's revelation.
Proclamation is bound up with the communion of saints.
In fact, dialogue among fellow men is more than a mere
phenomenon; it is a basic structure of all existence-28
Proclamation does possess some peculiarities which set it
apart from other areas of theology. Whereas dogmatics
encompasses the whole of theology in a unified and formal
way, proclamation, catering to particular situation, is onesided; stress is placed on the one aspect which fits the
need. Yes, preaching is announced in a more personal and
direct way, i.e., in alkerygmatic-existential way".29 It is
only in the Postscript to his Theology and Preaching that
Ott tells us what proclamation is; proclamation is "disclosure".
Here lies the curious twist. To avoid being labeled a disciple
of natural theology, Ott defines disclosure as a methodological concept "inspired by phenomenology and its maxim: 'Let
us observe things themselves"; But no longer are "the
things themselves" concrete Bible texts. The phenomena are
now those disclosures of revelation and of the Unthought
encountered by the believer in the complex situation
described above. Disclosure says even more about proclamation.
For what disclosure is not is demonstration--truth assertions
claiming demonstrable accuracy.31

In other words, proclama-
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tion assumes the form of non-objective speech, a form of
language similar to poetry.

CHAPTER V
AN ONTOLOGICAL HERMENEUTIC
The summaries and conclusions of the past two chapters
will now be presented. Martin Heidegger has been the predominent and guiding influence in the development of the
"new hermeneutic". His Sein und Zeit hermeneutic--a return to Dasein along the lines of Husserl's phenomenology-sought to clarify the structures (Existentiales) of man's
being. This analysis revealed that man is thrown (Geworfen)
into his situation (Being-in-the-world). An additional human polarity is also revealed. Man is fallen--swallowed up
in the "they" he concentrates his thinking on present trivialities; man is ex-sistent--he stands out futurally to accept
his limiting factor, death. Acceptance of death and orienting onds life accordingly, says Heidegger, is authentic
living. But Sein und Zeit claimed to be only a provisional
experiment leading to the final task of analysing Being
itself. Heidegger's later writings have leaned in this
direction, and consequently his hermeneutic has sought to

1

fulfill the second and extended task he assigned to it.

Ex-sistent is no longer referred to as standing out toward
ones death. Man now ex-sists because he stands out in the
light of Being. That which is in need of clarification is
no longer Dasein but Being, and the corresponding hermeneutic
is no longer ontic but ontological.2 The change is evidenced
by the prominent place given to language and within language
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the position which poetry is accorded. Poetry soars above
mundane existence and forms a mediating link between Dasein
and Sein. A further indication of this ontological turn
is signalled in Sein's domineering control as to where, when
and how it communicates itself to man. This ontological
shift, naturally conducive to theology, has stimulated and
moulded the present thought of Heinrich Ott and become the
characteristic mark of the "new hermeneutic". In what folaows,
this claim will be substantiated by marshalling the evidence presented in the past chapters and by taking into
account some recent reactions to the Ott-Heidegger combination.
1 Ott has assigned to philosophy, and especially
that of Martin Heidegger, a definite role in theology.
First, this is evidenced by the heavy value Ott places
upon thinking (Denken). Ott's primary presupposition is
that fides quaerens intellectum. Theology's task necessarily
involves rational processes and formulations. Granted
this, Ott attaches himself to Heidegger, for in Ott's estimation Heidegger is the "thinker of thinkers".3 Heidegger
also questions metaphysics, its feasibility as a method for
the quest of Being, an insight that makes him revelant for
theology.4 Ott too has openly championed the overcoming of
metaphysics in theology and gladly displays a portion of a
letter sent to him by Heidegger upon the publication of
Ott's Denken and Sein. Says Heidegger, "As long as
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anthropological-cosmological conceptualizing of existentialism
are not overcome and pushed to the side, theology will never
enter into the freedom of saying what is entrusted to it".5
Second, Ott's relation to philosophy and Heidegger is openly
proclaimed by him (Ott) on several occasions. Denken und Sein
quotes several passages from Heidegger's Letter On Humanism
and IdentitAt und Differenz in which the author notes possi-

ble openings for a theological venture.6 What Is SystematicTheology:;
formulates this thesis: "With this, we return to Heidegger.
I claim--and this is my tenth thesis--that the understanding
of systematic theology developed here corresponds to the
understanding of thinking and of language offered by Heidegger".7
In presenting the linguistic structures of poetry as preparation for developing the non-objective nature of theological
language, Ott supports his presentation with a Heideggerian
image.8 Finally, while contending against Bultmann and Fuchs
and their understanding of the task of theology, Ott once
more shores up his views by appealing to Heidegger.9
Ott's affinity with philosophy and Heidegger has not
gone by unchallenged. From within the framework of theology,
Ott's basic assumption--fides quaerens intellectum--must be
granted. Theology as the logos about divine things is by
definition rational and logical. Since faith comprises
the relationship between God and man, and since the human
side of this polarity should, to experience a more meaningful relationship, be informed by a knowledge of what the
world and man are, philosophy is asked to provide such information.10 Nevertheless, Jonas claims that since Heidegger
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has borrowed so much from theology,11 while others have
argued that Ott has done the same with philosophy, both
philosophy and theology should examine the validity of these
procedures. Approaching this same fault from another angle,
Michalson and Jdngel have criticized the one-sidedness of
Ott's relation. Heidegger's philosophy is valuable for its
critical function in the service of contempory theology.
By itself it is not a theological expression. Therefore
Ott's dialogue with Heidegger remains onesided.12 Or the
partiality is seen to reside in Ott's bias for Heidegger
alone of all the philosophers. Theology is interested
in understanding human thought, not just the thinking of
one man.13 An additional censure is leveled by JUngel at
Ott for accepting a Heideggerian transcendental which is
not Heideggerian. That is, recognizing Sein as the transcendental presupposition of thinking, Ott still remains within
metaphysics, for thinking makes suppositions and these are
metaphysical.18 After all this, Jonas proposes some guidelines for a worthwhile theology/philosophy dialogue. The
philosophy most adequate for theology would be the one that
best deals with being. Since theology can never wait for a
philosophical consensus on this matter, the theologian may
be guided in his choice by: the appeal of infinity, the
lessons past liaisons with philosophy have taught, present
needs, choosing the philosophy most helpful in discharging
theology's task and the one least dangerous, least seductive,
least alienating.15
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2 Ott has espoused an ontological hermeneutic.
The most obvious proof of Ott's ontological outlook
is his almost wholesale adoption of Heidegger--the philosopher
who acknowledges the primacy of Being. Yet Ott's own writings
offer us more precise corroboration. First and most telling
is Ott's shift in viewing phenomenology. "The things themselves" in a more ontic, historic approach would have been
concrete Bible texts and pericopes. At first for Ott they
were. But Bible passages were merely provisional, preparatory
steps designed to place us in the openness of revelation.16
"The things themselves" thus become revelation's utterances.
Coming from the unthought secrecy of the Holy (Nothingness/
Sein), such phenomena are ontological and a hermeneutic
designed to cope with them is similarly ontological. Ott's
close conjunction between theology and preaching occasions
the second piece of evidence. Preaching begins with texts
and ends with people. If anything is ontic, it is preaching.
After completing a book on preaching, all Ott can say is
that preaching is "disclosure"--disclosure of the human situation. Does not this sound like the early Heidegger
concerned with clarifying Dasein's Existentiales? It does
with one major exception. Heidegger's insights remained
human; Dasein manifested its own structures. Ott's
"disclosure" comes not from men.
That such
under the
His light
under the

disclosure succeeds....is something that lies
will of God. It succeeds when He allows
to shine upon us. But we begin to think
presupposition that we have already seen the
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light of God in His word, and that it will perhaps
please Him to allow us by grace to see it more and
more and ever afresh. Dominus illuminatio mea--et
illuminatio mundi. The Lord is my light--and the
light of the world! But it is just under this presupposition that our thinking is carried out. For
this reason the methodological principle of "disclosure"
belongs necesarily to the quest of fides quaerens
intellectum.i7
Ott's "disclosure" is ontological. A third sign of Ott's
ontological propensity is the elevated position and nonobjective form of language in his thinking. Language's
action is twofold: the revealing action of the Holy and
man's corresponding answer communicated among other men.
Necessarily prior is the former--the house of Being in which
the "inner"/"outer" continuum can be experienced.18 Like
poetry such language is an event; it brings us to a place-the light of Being. Man hears and answers. In answering
he must incorporate language (Sprache) into speech so that
he can carry on a conversation (Gesprach) with fellow men
(communion of saints). Once again the prominent concern is
with the movement of the Holy to man, with the originative
language event which gives rise to human communication--both
ontological concerns. And this I submit is the distinguishing mark of the Robinson defined "new hermeneutic". Besides
those ideas of Fuchs and Ebeling mentioned in chapter two19
I quote from the final pages of Robinson's introductory chapter.
This emphasis upon analyzing the possibility of interpretation as it in fact takes place, and thus upon the
analysis of what is, is designated by Gadamer as an
"ontological turn in hermeneutic". "This ontological
turn in hermeneutic signifies its elimination as a
doctrine of a special art or method. It makes the
theory'of understanding into a central philosophical
problematic."...Word is "selfless", and what the
Biblical author is talking about transcends his selfunderstanding. What language has to say must be sought
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in terms of its subject matter, so that the word
"disappears" into what it has to say. To be sure,
what the word has to say does not lie outside language
as understood by the new hermeneutic --a point made
by Heidegger and conceded by Gadamer. Yet it is this
dialectic between language and its subject matter
(Sprache and Sache) rather than that between mythological language and the existential self-understanding it
objectifies, which designates the point at whic4,the
hermeneutical discussion in Germany now stands."
Opposition to Ott's degree of non-objectifying language
has likewise appeared. The most penetrating remarks are
those of Hans Jonas. Non-objectifying language does occur
in the Psalmists, prophets and prayers, he agrees. But
the theologian's task, bound up with theoretical discourse,
is likewise bound up with objective language. Its task is
to recognize the inadequate language but to keep this necessary inadequacy transparent for what is to be indicated by
it. For myth taken literally is crudest objectification;
and myth taken allegorically is sophisticated objectification; but myth taken symbolically is the glass through which
we see darkly.21
Therefore, taking all these considerations into account,
with Carl Michalson I also claim that for Ott two things
remain: "(1) an interpretation in which being and not
human existence is the horizon for hermeneutical interrogation; and (2) a deduction of the relevant questions to which
being will reveal its secrets in the exegetical moment...Ott
now proposes to develop theological hermeneutic as an
ontological enterprize".22 Ott's project is largely a result
of his dependency on and agreement with Martin Heidegger.
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Mention should be made of several remaining problems
that, though lying outside the scope of this paper, are
relevant for further discussions. First are the criticisms
of Jonas, JUngel and Michalson mentioned above. Second is
the supression of the historical objected to by Michalson in
his article "Theology As Ontology And As History". Third is
the relation, reaction and influence Ott has to his great
teachers Karl Barth and Rudolf Bultmann. Finally one must
come face to face with the provocative interpretation with
which Langan concludes his work on Heidegger. Heidegger's
final analysis cannot comport with a Christian outlook. For
the Christian the end (telos) is a transcendental Other
outside human temporality. For Heidegger authenticity is
Dasein accepting his finitude in which Being unfolds itself
(though never completely).23 Because of his failure to
deal adequately with the Other, Heidegger's
"mystery" turns out to hide no incomprehensibly rich
other, but only our own limits; the Heilige turns out
to hold no real gift, but is rather an expression of
our finite "not yet"; the "grace of Being" turns out
to be no real gift, for it is drawn inexplicably from
our own resources. Aletheia itself finally fails to
be an end and motive force,,to become an historical
sign of our incompleteness.
Heidegger's apparent rapport with theology might not be so
beneficial after all.
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170tt, Theology and Preaching, p. 156.
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